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Abstract This paper considers the education of the labour
force based on an analysis of trends in and the relationships
between job polarization and skills mismatch. Both job polar-
ization and skills mismatch have become topics of increas-
ing interest, but relationships between the two have been
relatively neglected in the literature. We argue that the rela-
tionship between polarization and skills mismatch is an em-
pirical matter, which we analyse at both the macroeconomic
and microeconomic level in European countries. A novel job
polarization index (JPI) is proposed to measure imbalanced
job polarization. It takes into account not only the change in
the share of medium-level jobs, as is typical for measuring
pure polarization, but also the imbalance between the change
in high-level and low-level jobs. Skills mismatch at macro-
level is measured by a skills mismatch index (SMI), while
traditional measures of undereducation and overeducation
are used at the microeconomic level. At the macroeconomic
level, we estimate a system of two equations, one for each
of the country-level variables gauging polarization and mis-
match, respectively. Imbalanced job polarization measured
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by the JPI negatively affects skills mismatch at the macroeco-
nomic level (SMI), but there is no significant reverse effect.
Thereafter we consider the microeconomic level and study
the determinants of mismatch using multi-level mixed ef-
fects logistic models. The effect of imbalanced job polariza-
tion on individual-level mismatch was arguably favourable
for individuals in non-crisis time, decreasing overeducation
risk although also increasing the chances of undereducation,
both gauged using the normative measure, but unfavourable
during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the fol-
lowing two years.
Keywords Job polarization · Imbalanced polarization ·
Skills mismatch · Job polarization index · Skills mismatch
index · Overeducation · Undereducation
1 Introduction
An adequately educated and trained labour force is essen-
tial for economic growth. Education and training raise the
productivity of workers and create capacity to innovate and
adopt new technologies. Conversely, shortages of educated
and skilled workers, or workers with education and skills
that do not match labour market needs, lower the potential
for growth and may raise unemployment. However, trans-
lating ‘adequate’ into concrete education and training poli-
cies is a challenging task, not least because jobs are contin-
uously changing. Structural change, technological change,
globalization and trade have a bearing on the tasks and du-
ties performed in our economies, which are to an important
extent reflected in differential changes in job growth across
occupations. These changes in the occupational structure, by
implication, affect the economy-wide requirements in terms
of education and skills of workers. Furthermore, various im-
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perfections in labour markets give rise to skills mismatch,
and this issue has risen on policy agendas because of the
skills-intensive nature of much economic and technological
change, as well as the impact of the economic crisis (Cedefop
2010; European Commission 2012; World Economic Forum
2014).
This paper considers the education and training of the
labour force based on an analysis of trends in and the rela-
tionships between job polarization and skills mismatch. Both
job polarization and skills mismatch have become topics of
increasing interest, but most of the literature has focused ei-
ther on skills mismatch or on job polarization, and not on
possible relationships between the two. Nevertheless, such
relationships have been suggested in the literature on job
polarization (Goos and Manning 2007).
Job polarization means that the share of high- and low-
skill jobs grow at the expense of medium-skill jobs, and such
trends have been linked to the decline in the demand for rou-
tine or codifiable tasks, including both manual and cognitive
tasks (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Goos et al. 2014, 2013).
Starting from a hypothetical steady state in the labour mar-
ket in which the supply of education and skills perfectly
matches demand, and all jobs are fulfilled by adequately
trained workers, polarization would have several effects that
could increase skills mismatch. In particular, in the absence
of a supply response, underqualification could be expected
to rise among workers performing the growing share of high-
skill jobs, while overqualification would rise for workers per-
forming low-skill jobs, if these jobs are increasingly taken
by workers previously employed in medium-skill jobs.
Whether such trends would materialize is uncertain for at
least three reasons. Firstly, the supply of educated workers in
many countries is on an upward trend, which may or may not
be in accordance with the increasing share of high-skill jobs.
Secondly, the literature suggests that labour markets are of-
ten characterized by a certain extent of skills mismatch, and
different starting positions with regard to current or past lev-
els of skills mismatch will clearly affect how polarization
at the demand side will play out. In theory, if the supply of
educated workers is polarized (in the sense of relatively high
shares of workers with low and high levels of education),
polarization at the demand side could lead to a reduction of
measured levels of skills mismatch. Finally, job polarization
may interact with unemployment, which adds to the uncer-
tainty with regard to labour market outcomes if workers with
different levels of education are affected differently by un-
employment.
Therefore, the relationship between polarization and skills
mismatch seems an empirical matter.We analyse the relation-
ships between imbalanced job polarization and skills mis-
match at two levels in European countries. At the country-
level, we estimate a system of two equations, one for each of
the country-level variables gauging imbalanced polarization
and mismatch, respectively. The main result is that imbal-
anced job polarization decreases mismatch between skills de-
mand and skills supply proxied by level of educational attain-
ment, but there is no statistically significant effect from skills
mismatch to imbalanced job polarization. Thereafter we con-
sider the individual-level and study the determinants of mis-
match by running multi-level mixed effects logistic models.
Determinants are divided into two categories: individual-
level and macro-level, and imbalanced job polarization is
one of the macro-level determinants. The main result is that
the effect of imbalanced job polarization on individual-level
mismatch was arguably favourable for individuals in non-
crisis time (it decreases overeducation risk although it in-
creases the chances of undereducation, both gauged using
the normative measure) but unfavourable during the global
financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the following two years.
The effect on overeducation gauged by the statistical measure
is the opposite to the effect based on the normative measure,
but we demonstrate that these results nevertheless allow for
a coherent view on the interaction between job polarization
and skills mismatch in Europe.
The paper contributes to the literature by an analysis of
the relationship between job polarization and skills mismatch
in a large group of European economies based on a job po-
larization index, which allows for the measurement of the
extent of imbalanced job polarization in a single number for
a given country and year. Similarly, we use a recently in-
troduced measure of skills mismatch at the macroeconomic
level, alongside traditional measures of skills mismatch at
the individual level.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. We
start with a review of the literature on job polarization and
skills mismatch in Sect. 2. Subsequently, we define measures
of polarization and skills mismatch (at macro- and micro-
levels) and review trends in Sect. 3. Section 4 first analyses
the relationships between imbalanced job polarization and
macro-level skills mismatch, and thereafter between imbal-
anced job polarization and individual-level skills mismatch.
The last section concludes.
2 Determinants of Job Polarization and Skills
Mismatch
The trend in job polarization (Goos and Manning 2007) has
been observed in many countries. The most common expla-
nation is technological change, which leads to the replace-
ment of routine tasks undertaken by workers by tasks per-
formed by computers and associated technologies (the ‘rou-
tinization hypothesis’). For example, bank services available
online have increasingly replaced traditional banking offices,
16
Imbalanced Job Polarization and Skills Mismatch in Europe
which limits the demand for clerks and increases the demand
for technicians and professionals to maintain online systems.
But other factors discussed in the literature include inter-
national trade and outsourcing of routine tasks to countries
with lower labour costs (Goos et al. 2009). In the United
States, polarization of jobs has also been linked to growing
wage inequality. Based on census data, it was found that the
growing share of incomes going to high-skilled workers has
increased demand for non-tradeable time-intensive services
that are difficult to automate – such as food preparation and
cleaning – provided by low-skilled workers (the ‘consump-
tion hypothesis’) (Mazzolari and Ragusa 2013). Based on
data for 16 countries, strong evidence for the routinization
hypothesis was found in Europe, and only weak evidence for
the effects of offshoring and inequality on job polarization
(Goos et al. 2009).
The relationship between job polarization and business
cycles is the subject of intense debate based on apparently
mixed evidence. According to some authors, job polariza-
tion is intrinsically related to economic cycles. Jaimovich
and Siu (2012) find that in the US, much or all of the job loss
in medium-skill occupations occurs during economic down-
turns, while jobless recoveries are also accounted for by the
disappearance of such jobs. On the contrary, high- and low-
skill occupations, if they experience contractions, tend to re-
bound in accordance with trends in output during upswings.
Jaimovich and Siu, therefore, consider job polarization to
be a key driver of recent business cycles, but others are less
convinced. Another US-based study (Foote and Ryan 2013)
found that recessions were synchronized across workers with
different levels of skills, and even high-skilled workers were
far from immune. Finally, Tüzemen and Willis (2013) sug-
gest that job polarization can best be seen as a structural
phenomenon. Polarization accelerates during recessions and
contributes to jobless recoveries, but is not causing them.
Job polarization has been linked to skills mismatch by
Goos and Manning (2007), who argue that the scarcity of
medium-skill jobs may force educated workers to take low-
skill jobs. Polarization was found to be associated with
increasing overqualification in Germany between the mid
1980s and the mid 2000s (Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann
2011). A framework where several types of mismatch be-
tween vacancies and job seekers can help explain unemploy-
ment is developed by S¸ahin et al. (2014). To capture the
effects of job polarization on mismatch, the authors exam-
ine the behaviour of groups of routine occupations that have
become less important, and find a strong relationship with
unemployment.
Much research has been devoted to skills mismatch in re-
lation to macro-level demand factors. Overeducation behaves
counter-cyclically: the highly-educated crowd out the lower-
educated during economic downturns (Croce and Ghignoni
2012; Kiersztyn 2013). Higher shares of temporary contracts
increase overeducation via lowering the selectivity of em-
ployers and workers, while higher long-term unemployment
decreases it by keeping less-able workers out of labour force
(Croce and Ghignoni 2012). A larger shadow economy does
not affect the mismatch likelihood of the locally-born, but
decreases the chances of overeducation of immigrants by
easing the job search process for the lower-skilled; finally,
employment protection legislation increases undereducation
(Aleksynska and Tritah 2013). Macro-level supply factors
also play a role: overeducation on a particular education level
increases with the share of population having that education
level (Di Pietro 2002).
Individual characteristics may be more important than
macro-level factors (Ghignoni and Verashchagina 2014). At
the microeconomic level, five categories of factors have been
found to affect the risk of overeducation: (1) ability, academic
performance, and personality; (2) gender and age; (3) immi-
grant background; (4) labour market and job characteristics;
and (5) characteristics of education.
Although an individual’s ability or academic performance
has proven to be difficult to capture in empirical work, re-
search, using various approximations, suggests that gradu-
ates with lower ability face a higher risk of overeducation
(Barone and Ortiz 2011; Chevalier 2003; Lianos et al. 2004;
Tarvid 2012; Verhaest and Omey 2010). Personality traits
also affect the risk of overeducation and frequently are more
important than ability (Blázquez and Budría 2012; Tarvid
2013). Empirical evidence about gender effects has been
mixed, with roughly equal number of studies concluding
that women have a higher skills mismatch risk than men
(Aleksynska and Tritah 2013; Baert et al. 2013; Betti et al.
2011; Karakaya et al. 2007; Ramos and Sanromá 2013; Tani
2012; Verhaest and Omey 2010; Verhaest and Van der Velden
2013) as those finding no difference across sex (Blázquez and
Budría 2012; Büchel and van Ham 2003; Chevalier 2003;
Chevalier and Lindley 2009; Frei and Sousa-Poza 2012;
Frenette 2004; Støslashren and Wiers-Jenssen 2010; Wirz
and Atukeren 2005); a few studies result in men being at a
relative disadvantage (European Commission 2012; Kiersz-
tyn 2013).1 The literature disagrees on the effect on overe-
ducation from age2. Some studies show that overeducation
decreases with age (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013; Jensen et
al. 2010; Robst 2008; Sutherland 2012) or has a U-shaped
1See also Quintini (2011) and European Commission (2012, p. 371
Footnote 17).
2The effect from labour market experience is similar to the effect from
age, as the two differ approximately by a constant representing the
duration of childhood and compulsory education.
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relationship with it (Tarvid 2012), while others report that
age is irrelevant (Blázquez and Budría 2012; Chevalier and
Lindley 2009; Frei and Sousa-Poza 2012; Kiersztyn 2013;
Wirz and Atukeren 2005). Overall, these results imply that
the young may still have a comparatively higher probabil-
ity of mismatch after controlling for other relevant factors.
First- and second-generation immigrants face higher risk of
mismatch (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013; Tarvid 2012) and
residence duration seems to have no effect on it (Aleksyn-
ska and Tritah 2013; Fernández and Ortega 2008). Where
overeducation decreases with the length of stay, it was inter-
preted as immigrants preferring unemployment (Støren and
Wiers-Jenssen 2010), may be affected by the country’s skill-
based immigration policy (Tani 2012), or happens only for
specific types of education (Beckhusen et al. 2013). Immi-
grating to a close country or having more knowledge about
it dampens the risk of overeducation (Aleksynska and Tri-
tah 2013; Tani 2012). Higher-quality education system in
the home country increases the chances of undereducation
(Aleksynska and Tritah 2013), but foreign education – even
for the locally-born – is not perfectly transferable to the local
labour market, as reflected by higher overeducation risk than
for the locally-educated (Støren and Wiers-Jenssen 2010).
The type of mismatch after migration also strongly depends
on that before migration (Piracha et al. 2012; Tani 2012).
Studies also found that overeducation risk decreases with
tenure (Büchel and van Ham 2003; Frei and Sousa-Poza
2012; Jensen et al. 2010; Karakaya et al. 2007; Wirz and
Atukeren 2005), which allows to conclude that labour mar-
ket experience acts as a substitute for formal education. Find-
ing a good match in a larger labour market should be easier,
and in Europe, the risk of overeducation in big cities is in-
deed substantially smaller than elsewhere (Ramos and San-
romá 2013; Tarvid 2012), although the reverse is observed in
the US (Beckhusen et al. 2013). Working without a contract
substantially increases the risk of overeducation, and this re-
sult is stable across European country groups (Tarvid 2012).
Research also shows that graduates in economics, law and
arts & humanities face higher overeducation risk (Barone
and Ortiz 2011; Betti et al. 2011; Chevalier 2003; Cutillo
and di Pietro 2006; Jauhiainen 2011; Ortiz and Kucel 2008;
Støren and Wiers-Jenssen 2010). Studies disagree on the sign
of the effect from educational attainment (in terms of years
or level). While some find that the risk decreases with attain-
ment (Barone and Ortiz 2011; Büchel and van Ham 2003;
Jensen et al. 2010), others report that higher years of ed-
ucation (Fernández and Ortega 2008; Jauhiainen 2011) or
a university degree (Frei and Sousa-Poza 2012; Wirz and
Atukeren 2005) increase the risk of overeducation.




Job polarization typically reflects a declining share of
“medium-level” occupations in the occupational structure,
and increasing shares of “low-level” and “high-level” oc-
cupations. Different studies then define these three groups
differently, e.g., based on mean wages by ISCO minor (two-
digit) groups (Fernández-Macías 2012; Goos et al. 2009) or
on the extent of cognitive, routine and manual tasks (Autor
and Dorn 2013; Jaimovich and Siu 2012). Typically, studies
do not provide a single measure of polarization and instead
attempt to explain changes in the employment shares in dif-
ferent occupations as such. An exception is Dauth (2014),
who proposes to regress employment growth rates in oc-
cupations on their rank according to average log wage and
rank-squared and then use the t-ratio of rank-squared to mea-
sure the extent of polarization. While this measure allows to
gauge the curvature along many occupation groups, it is dif-
ficult to decompose it in a meaningful way. The measure we
propose later in this section is defined for three occupation
groups only, but is more transparent and decomposable into
clear subcomponents.
Several measures of polarization were proposed in the in-
come polarization literature, but all of these have drawbacks.
For instance, the measure of Wolfson (1994),
2(1 − 2L(0.5) − Gini) × (mean/median), (1)
requires to specify mean and median levels of the underly-
ing variable and, in addition, L(0.5), which (in its original
application) is the income share of the bottom half of the pop-
ulation – but it does not make sense to specify the “mean”
or “median” job category in a given labour market, not even
speaking about defining L(0.5) for jobs. Similarly, in the












where θ and r are parameters, N is the total number of obser-
vations and K is the number of groups, it again does not make
sense to consider mean and median values of job category.






π1+αi πj |yi − yj |, (3)
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where K and α are parameters and (π , y) is a distribution
over different values of vector y, where πi is the number of
observations with y = yi (although it can be easily reformu-
lated into a probability). In our case, this measure could be
applied, in principle, because the three job levels can be rep-
resented as y1, y2 and y3 with respective probabilities, but
such approach does not allow for country idiosyncrasies and
assumes instead that all countries should ideally have the
same occupational structure.
Because the existing measures are inapplicable, we pro-
pose a new measure of job polarization. We need a single
measure that would show the extent of polarization at a point
in time. Ideally, this measure should distinguish between two
situations: skill upgrading, when the share of “high-level”
jobs grows, that of “medium-level” jobs declines, but that
of “low-level” jobs stays constant, and true polarization, a
similar situation but where the share of “low-level” jobs also
grows.
Before constructing this measure, it is important to define
polarization. In other words, when we say that the occupa-
tional structure is polarized, which comparison is made? In
this paper, we consider polarization for a given country at
a concrete point in time to be higher (lower) if the share of
“medium-level” jobs relative to its average value in the previ-
ous five years in the same country is lower (higher). Thus, the
measure should compare the current occupational structure
of a country to the typical recent occupational structure of the
same country. Comparing it to one specific year (e.g., previ-
ous year) could make the measure too unstable and subject
to business cycle effects, while taking a longer period over
which to measure the average might no longer reflect the typ-
ical occupational structure of the country (in addition, using
a longer period may be difficult in view of the availability of
consistent data for the 1990s).
To be more specific, this measure should be zero if the
share of “medium-level” jobs has not deviated from its typ-
ical value, positive when it decreased and negative when
it increased. Furthermore, given a change in the share of
“medium-level” jobs, the measure should be sensitive to the
relative changes in the share of “low-level” and “high-level”
jobs. The larger the increase in one of these shares relative
to the increase in the other, the larger should be the measure.
For instance, the measure should be larger if the share of
“high-level” jobs increases 15 percentage points and that of
“low-level” jobs increases 5 percentage points than if both
shares increase 10 percentage points.
Before we show the expression for such a measure, we
define an operator 5. For time series xt , the operator is
defined as follows:
5xt ≡ xt − 1
5
(xt−1 + xt−2 + xt−3 + xt−4 + xt−5) . (4)
Now we are ready to propose job polarization index (JPI)
as a measure of job polarization based on the division of
occupations into three groups:
p = 1
2
× (5l + 5h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in medium-level jobs reversed
×
imbalance in high-/low-level jobs︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1 + ∣∣5h − 5l
∣∣) × 100,
(5)
where 5l is change in the share of “low-level” jobs from
the average level in the last five years and 5h is defined
accordingly for “high-level” jobs, and | · | denotes the abso-
lute value. Time subscripts are suppressed for p, l and h for
readability. The sum in the first brackets is the reverse of the
change in the share of “medium-level” jobs. It determines
the main magnitude and direction of the index. The expres-
sion in the second brackets takes into account the imbalance
between the change in “high-level” and “low-level” jobs and
grows linearly3 with this difference. If that expression con-
sisted only of
∣∣5h − 5l
∣∣, it would be zero if 5h = 5l,
regardless of how large the change in “medium-level” jobs
is, and, as a result, p would also be zero. Because this is
not the behaviour we want the index to have, we add one to
the linear term in the second brackets. Hence, if 5h = 5l,
the expression in the second brackets is one and p equals
to 1/2 × (5l + 5h
) × 100. The multiplier 1/2 constrains
the index to be in the interval [ − 100, 100].4
The dependence of the JPI on two components may con-
fuse the reader. Indeed, if we see an increase in the index, is
it due to a drop in the share of “medium-level” jobs only or
is there also an imbalanced change at the high and low ends?
We can’t say, unless we decompose. This confusion, how-
ever, arises from the expectation that the index will show only
pure polarization – i.e., a change in the share of “medium-
level” jobs. The JPI measures what can be called imbalanced
polarization. The second component does not immediately
allow for a distinction between a skill upgrading case and a
true polarization case, as defined above. However, holding
3In principle, one can specify a quadratic dependence here,(
5h − 5l
)2
.We did that and found that the following results of the pa-
per remain qualitatively similar. The drawback of the quadratic depen-




and, hence, the whole term in the second brackets in (5) is only slightly
different from 1.0, making its presence in the equation questionable.
4It is straightforward to show that, under three restrictions, max p =
100 and min p = −100. These restrictions follow from the nature of
the parameters of function p (a change in a share cannot be larger than 1
and smaller than −1) and are as follows: (1) 5l ∈ [ − 1, 1], (2) 5h ∈
[ − 1, 1] and (3) 5l + 5h ∈ [ − 1, 1]. Because the function is fully
symmetric, it is sufficient to prove the upper border. It is clear from the
expression in the first brackets that the maximum is reached when that
expression equals one. Then the maximum of the second expression is
attained when one of the parameters is one and the other is zero, and this
maximum is (1 + |1 + 0|) = 2. Then p = 1/2 × 1 × 2 × 100 = 100.
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% high−skilled % medium−skilled
% low−skilled GDP growth
Change in % high−skilled Job polarization index
Fig. 1 Job Polarization Index and Occupational Distribution in Europe by Level of Skills. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILO (2013c).
The right panel of the figure shows unweighted averages based on data from the following 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. High-skill occupations comprise ISCO major
groups 1–3, medium-skill occupations include ISCO major groups 4–8 and low-skill occupations are elementary occupations (ISCO major group
9). The value of the index for a given country and year was determined from (5). E.g., the JPI for 2002 is based on the occupational structure in
2002 compared to the average occupational structure in 1997–2001.
the first component constant, the JPI will be higher in case of
skill upgrading than in case of true polarization, because the
imbalance in the changes in the ends is higher in the former
case than in the latter.
In this paper, we will use the JPI over three groups of oc-
cupations based on skill requirements defined by the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO, ILO
2013c). Thus, high-skill occupations constitute ISCO major
groups 1–3, medium-skill occupations include all occupa-
tions from ISCO major groups 4–8 and low-skill occupations
consist of elementary occupations (ISCO major group 9).
3.1.2 Trends
Figure 1 shows how the index performs on European data.
In Europe, the share of high-skill occupations increased on
average 5.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2012, with
a similar decrease in medium-skill occupations, while the
share of low-skill occupations remained flat throughout the
period. As expected from this behaviour, average JPI was
positive in 2002–2012, although it fell to 0.13 in 2011 and
rebounded to only 0.21 in 2012.
Its pattern was not strongly related to economic growth, as
accelerations in growth sometimes resulted in an acceleration
in the pace of increase in the JPI (e.g., in 2004) and sometimes
in a deceleration (e.g., in 2006–2007). At the height of the
economic crisis in 2009, the share of high-skill occupations
and the JPI both increased, which confirms the conclusion
by Eurofound (2013) regarding the polarizing effects of the
recession and the greater resilience of higher-paid jobs during
the crisis in Europe.5
Nevertheless, according to Cedefop (2012) projections,
job polarization is likely to continue to be important in Eu-
rope in the coming years, as most new jobs will be created
at the high-skill and low-skill ends of the spectrum, which
means that the JPI will remain positive.
As the left panel of Fig. 1 shows, although the average Eu-
ropean value of the JPI is close to zero, countries are highly
heterogeneous with respect to the values of the JPI in 2012 (in
2002, the index was positive in almost all countries). Luxem-
bourg and Portugal are leading the list with the index being
around 2.5, while Slovakia, Italy and Czech Republic are in
the bottom with their indices being around −1.5. Germany,
5Eurofound (2013) uses a far more detailed categorization of jobs than
the broad categories distinguished in this paper, which is based on oc-
cupations, sectors, as well as wages.
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Iceland and Romania have almost no polarization in 2012:
their indices are close to zero.
3.2 Macro-Level Skills Mismatch
3.2.1 Measures
Labour markets around the world continuously demonstrate
various types of “mismatch,” including mismatch between
the number of job seekers and employment opportunities,
which is reflected in unemployment. In contrast to unem-
ployment, however, which is measured according to interna-
tional standards, a uniform typology or measurement frame-
work regarding skills mismatch and related issues, such as
skills shortages, is lacking.
As skills and competencies per se are not measured by
the regular statistical programmes of most countries, skill
proxies are used such as qualifications and years of educa-
tion at the supply side, and occupations at the demand side.
The literature offers several overviews of types, strengths
and weaknesses of skills mismatch measures (Johansen and
Gatelli 2012; Quintini 2011; Sparreboom and Powell 2009;
Wilson et al. 2013).
At the macro level, we focus on skill shortage and surplus
in this paper, which seems appropriate for the analysis at
hand. According to ISCO, low-skill occupations are matched
with primary education, medium-skill with secondary and
high-skill with tertiary education. For the labour market to
be in equilibrium, a shift to high-skill occupations should,
therefore, be accompanied by a similar shift to tertiary edu-
cation at the supply side. The latter is clearly what has been
happening for decades in European countries. The propor-
tion of persons with tertiary education in the EU has been
steadily rising from 17 per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent in 2012
(Eurostat data). Nevertheless, this is insufficient to match the
polarization trend, which resulted in 40 per cent of all em-
ployment in the EU in 2012 being in high-skilled occupa-
tions, according to Eurostat.6
This apparent shortage of highly educated workers helps
explain the inverse relationship between unemployment risk
and education level. In Europe as a whole (EU-27, Euro-
stat data), individuals with primary education saw their un-
employment risk gradually increase relative to that of the
tertiary-educated from 2.4 times in 2000 to 3.0 times in 2013.
The risk of unemployment for the secondary-educated was
around twice higher than for the tertiary-educated in 2000,
but this ratio dropped to 1.5 by 2013.
6Europe 2020, which is the EU’s growth strategy, aims to raise tertiary
educational attainment to at least 40 per cent of the population aged 30
to 34 by 2020 (according to Eurostat, this proportion was 36 per cent
in 2012).
Differences in unemployment rates by level of education
of workers signal skills mismatch, as such differences in-
dicate that the level of educational attainment of workers
is an important determinant of the probability of finding a
job besides the overall level of unemployment. These differ-
ences can be summarized in a skills mismatch index (SMI),
which was introduced by ILO (2013a, 2013b), based on a
comparison of the structure of educational attainment of the
employed and the unemployed.











where i is an indicator for the level of education (primary or
less, secondary or tertiary), | · | denotes the absolute value,
Ei/E is the proportion of the employed with education level i
andUi/U is the proportion of the unemployed with education
level i.
It should be emphasized that this index captures one di-
mension of mismatch, namely mismatch between skills de-
mand (defined by the skills of the employed) and skills supply
(defined by the skills of the unemployed), both proxied by
level of educational attainment. The index does not capture
mismatch at more detailed levels of skills or mismatch be-
tween the skills of the employed and their job requirements.
Apart from being a measure of mismatch between skills
supply and demand, the SMI can be interpreted as a summary
measure of the relative position of labour market groups with
different levels of education (that is, a measure of inequal-
ity). If primary, secondary and tertiary graduates all have the
same unemployment rate, the index will have a value of zero
(no dissimilarity between groups), while the index would
reach a value of 1 or 100 per cent (complete dissimilarity)
if, for example, all those with primary and tertiary educa-
tion are employed and all those with secondary education
are unemployed.
3.2.2 Trends
A wide range of skills mismatch is observed across the sam-
ple of 31 European countries (see Fig. 2). In 2012, the SMI
ranged from 4.3 per cent in Romania to 24.6 per cent in
Lithuania. In most countries, the index increased, compared
to its value in 2000. Nevertheless, it dropped in 11 out of
31 countries, with the largest decrease observed in Roma-
nia (−15.5 percentage points) and Luxembourg (−8.7 per-
centage points). The largest increase during these 12 years
happened in Spain (12.8 percentage points), Malta (11.9 per-
centage points) and Latvia (9.9 percentage points). In case
of Spain, such a spike occurred because unemployment dou-
bled for the primary-educated, increased 75 per cent for the
secondary-educated, but rose only 37 per cent for the tertiary-
educated in this time period (Eurostat data).
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Fig. 2 Mismatch Index in Europe in 2012 (Left) and Its Trends in 2000–2012 (Right). Source: based on data from ILO (2013c). Trends based on
simple averages of country values. There are no observations for Croatia in 2000–01; thus, mismatch index in 2012 is compared with its value in
2002 for Croatia in the left panel.
It should be noted that mismatch between supply and de-
mand measured on the basis of unemployment rates by level
of educational attainment is not an indication of the quality
or responsiveness of education and training systems as such.
High-quality education and training improves the employa-
bility of workers, and in this way contributes to low unem-
ployment. However, among those who are unemployed, there
are likely to be many workers who did not benefit from the
education system to the same extent as the employed. InAus-
tria, Germany and Finland, for example, the SMI was above
the European average in 2012, despite low unemployment
rates and well-regarded education and training systems.
The right panels of Fig. 2 show that after sliding down in
2000–2003, the average SMI rebounded and started growing
until the peak in 2008, when the global financial crisis started.
This reflects that while unemployment rates for workers with
primary, secondary and tertiary education all decreased dur-
ing this period, the relative decrease was larger for those
with secondary and tertiary education. The crisis dampened
the mismatch, as the relative increase in the unemployment
rates for workers with secondary and tertiary education be-
came larger than that for workers with primary education.7
7The change in percentage points was larger for workers with primary
education, which has often been used as an argument that these workers
were hit “relatively hard” during the crisis (ILO 2012; OECD 2012).
The crisis, thus, resulted in less skills mismatch on this mea-
sure, which may appear counter-intuitive. However, it should
be borne in mind that the SMI is constructed in such a way
that it is independent from the level of unemployment and
reflects how different groups of workers are affected in rel-
ative terms. The decrease in the index demonstrates that the
relative position of better educated workers deteriorated in
comparison with their position in 2008.
The average index primarily decreased for men and the
young (aged 15–29), whose average indices dropped around
2 percentage points each. On the contrary, the average mis-
match for women and adults (aged 30 and above) lost only
around 0.5 percentage points by the end of the crisis. After
the crisis, the growth in average mismatch index resumed.
3.3 Micro-Level Skills Mismatch
3.3.1 Measures
We complement the measure of skills mismatch at the macro
level with measures of overeducation and undereducation at
the individual level. The concept of overeducation (undere-
ducation) means having more (less) education than required
by the job, but the measurement has proven to be quite con-
troversial. Four different approaches exist in the literature
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Table 1 Measurements of Mismatch.
Idea Advantages Disadvantages
Normative Use a pre-determined mapping be-




Assumes constant mappings over all jobs of
a given occupation
Costly to create and update the mapping
Statistical The overeducated are those with ed-
ucation level higher by some ad-hoc
value than the mean or mode of the




Assumes constant mappings over all jobs of
a given occupation
Sensitive to cohort effects




Respondents are asked about their
perceptions of the extent their edu-
cation or skills are used in their job
Always up-to-date
Corresponds with requirements in
the individual firm
Subjective bias: respondents may overstate
job requirements, inflate their status or re-
produce actual hiring standards
Income-ratioa Overeducation is a continuous vari-
able measured by comparing actual
and potential income
Reflects that one of the goals of in-
vestment in education is maximising
income
Indirect measure, can be influenced by many
other factors
Source: Authors’ elaboration; (Hartog 2000; Quintini 2011)
a This measure is not typically discussed in the literature; it connects overeducation to another failure in the labour market – underpayment. See
Guironnet and Peypoch (2007) or Jensen et al. (2010) for examples.
(see Table 1) with their own advantages and disadvantages,
and there is no agreement on a single “correct” measure.
Moreover, different measures may lead to very different re-
sults, and this also leads to differences in model estimates in
which overeducation is used.
In this paper, we use the normative measure based on
ISCO alongside a statistical measure,8 which allows for a
categorisation of workers that is consistent with the macro
level measure (following ILO (2013c, 2014)). The norma-
tive measure starts from the division of major occupational
groups (first-digit ISCO levels) into the three groups used
in previous sections and assigns a level of education to each
group in accordance with the International Standard Classi-
fication of Education (ISCED). Workers in a particular group
who have the assigned level of education are considered well
matched: workers with tertiary education match high-skill
jobs, the secondary-educated match medium-skill jobs and
those with primary education match low-skill jobs. Those
who have a higher (lower) level of education are consid-
ered overeducated (undereducated). For instance, a univer-
sity graduate working as a clerk (a medium-skill occupation)
is overeducated, while a secondary school graduate working
as an engineer (a high-skill occupation) is undereducated.
An advantage of the ISCO-based measure is that the def-
inition of mismatch does not change over time and the re-
sults are, therefore, strictly comparable. A possible disad-
vantage of this method is that it does not take the actual dis-
tribution of educational attainment into account. Therefore,
in high-attainment countries, the proportion of the overedu-
cated might be higher. Another disadvantage of this measure
is that, by construction, it does not allow for either overed-
8European Social Survey data, which we use for running models of
over-/undereducation, do not allow to construct a measure of mismatch
based on self-assessment.
ucation in major groups 1 to 3 or undereducation in major
group 9.9
The statistical measure is constructed based on the years
of full-time education of workers and their occupation code.
For each 2-digit ISCO group in each country and year, the
mean number of years of education, as well as its standard
deviation, is measured. Then the over- (under-) educated are
respondents who have education years above (below) the
mean level by one standard deviation. An advantage of this
method is that there is less heterogeneity among groups of
jobs compared with the three groups according to the nor-
mative method. In addition, this method is less sensitive to
the average level of educational attainment in a country, as
this will be reflected in higher mean levels of education. But
this is also a disadvantage in the sense that mean levels may
or may not be driven by job requirements.10
We will use data from the European Social Survey (ESS),
rounds 1 through 6 (European Social Survey 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). ESS is a biennial survey cover-
ing over 30 countries, although country coverage differs by
round: only 16 out of 36 countries appear in all six rounds.
This data source was selected because it has rich individual-
level data, including data on individual’s personality, which
can be used as explanatory variables in the models of mis-
match.11
9Workers in advanced economies usually have at least a completed
primary education.
10In countries with very low levels of educational attainment, the mean
level of education may be a poor indicator of job requirements, and
the statistical method may be inappropriate (Sparreboom and Nübler
2013).
11ISCO sub-major groups with less than five observations in a particular
country and round of ESS will be excluded from the analysis of mean-
based mismatch measure.
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Fig. 3 Incidence of Mismatch in Europe, 2012. Source: Authors’ cal-
culations based on ESS Round 6 data. Design weights applied.
3.3.2 Trends
Countries differ markedly in mismatch patterns (Fig. 3). The
ISCO-based measure shows that across all workers, overe-
ducation in 2012 ranged from below 5 per cent in Portugal
to above 25 per cent in Cyprus, Ukraine and Russia, while
undereducation was below 10 per cent in Russia and Ukraine
and exceeded 40 per cent in Spain, Italy and Portugal. The
range in mismatch according to the statistical measure is
smaller: from around 11 per cent in Kosovo to above 20 per
cent in Slovakia for overeducation and from 8 per cent in
Slovakia to above 15 per cent in Iceland, Estonia and the
Netherlands for undereducation.
Considering stable recent country-specific trends in skills
mismatch in countries with sufficient data to assess trends
(ILO 2014), we find that in the majority of countries (16
out of 26) overeducation increased on at least one measure,
while it increased on both measures in Cyprus. Seven coun-
tries experienced a downward trend in overeducation by at
least one measure (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Poland,
Slovenia and Ukraine). Undereducation decreased on at least
one measure in the majority of countries (18 out of 26), and
decreased on both measures in Bulgaria, Israel, Poland, Por-
tugal, Russia and Slovakia. However, in five countries it was
growing (Denmark, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands and
Switzerland).
In countries covered in all six ESS rounds, the average
incidence of overeducation is increasing and the average in-
cidence of undereducation is decreasing from 2002 to 2012
(Fig. 4). According to the ISCO-based measure, the increase
was 3.2 percentage points, while the mean-based measure
shows a U-shaped pattern in 2002–2010 followed by a 0.4
percentage point drop in 2012. As was noted before, the
ISCO-based measure in part reflects an increase in the ed-
ucational attainment levels of workers. However, the sharp
rise in the average incidence of overeducation according to
both the ISCO- and mean-based measures during 2008–2010
(by 1.5 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively) is likely to
also reflect increased competition for jobs associated with
the employment crisis.
Undereducation dropped 8.2 percentage points in 2002–
2012 on the ISCO-based measure, which again partly reflects
an increase in workers’ educational attainment levels, and by
0.5 percentage points, according to the statistical measure.
Similarly to overeducation, the downward trend in undered-
ucation accelerated in 2010, decreasing by 2.9 and 0.14 per-
centage points, according to the ISCO- and mean-based mea-
sures, respectively, which is again consistent with stronger
competition for jobs between 2008 and 2010.
Women are more frequently overeducated and less fre-
quently undereducated than men of their age group, accord-
ing to the ISCO-based measure, and both results are stable
over time (Fig. 5). However, the statistical measure leads
to the opposite conclusion for overeducation: not only are
women less frequently overeducated, but gender differences
also decrease over time. There is no contradiction between
these seemingly contrasting results, however. The normative
measure shows that women are more frequently working in
jobs where their education level is, from the normative point
of view, not necessary. The statistical measure reflects that, at
the same education level, women have less years of education
than men12, which is why they are less likely than men to have
more years of education than the mean years of education in
their occupation. For undereducation, the statistical measure
produces intertwined dynamics for both sexes. According to
both measures, workers aged 15–29 face higher overeduca-
tion risk and lower undereducation risk than workers aged
30 and above.
Disaggregation of average mismatch dynamics by skill
level of jobs (Fig. 6) mostly shows clear trends for the
ISCO-based measure but more complicated dynamics of
the mean-based measure. ISCO-based overeducation was in-
creasing and undereducation was decreasing during 2002–
2012.13 Similarly, mean-based undereducation on high- and
medium-skill jobs shows a general downward trend – this
time, with the exception of the undereducation on high-skill
jobs, which jumped in 2012 to the level it had in 2002–2004.
On low-skill jobs, mean-based undereducation dropped three
percentage points in 2004 and then started increasing in circa
1.5 percentage point jumps (in 2006 and 2010, resting some-
what in 2008 and 2012). Mean-based overeducation on high-
skill jobs returned in 2010–2012 back to its level in 2002
12As shown by a two-level regression with country-level random effects
controlling for ESS round (not reported), women on average have 0.15
less years of education then men with the same education level. Among
the tertiary-educated, the effect from being a female is −0.26 years of
education.
13Undereducation has a slightly more complex dynamics, rebounding
in 2008 and 2012, but the overall downward direction was kept.
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Fig. 4 Average Incidence of Over-/Undereducation in Europe. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESS data. The figure shows unweighted
averages based on data from countries appearing in all six ESS rounds (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). The shaded area shows the range of incidence across
countries. Labelled points outside shaded areas represent countries with a significantly different incidence of skills mismatch from other countries
in a particular round. These outliers have an incidence outside the interval [p25 − 1.5 × IQR, p75 + 1.5 × IQR], where pi is ith percentile of the
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Fig. 5 Average Incidence of Over-/Undereducation in Europe by Sex and Age Group. Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESS data. The figure
shows unweighted averages over same countries as in Fig. 4. Countries that have significantly different (as defined in the notes to Fig. 4) skills
mismatch incidence from other countries in a round in at least one of four sex–age group pairs are excluded from the calculation of the averages in
that round.
after jumping one percentage point in 2004 first and then
immediately dropping 1.5 percentage points in 2006 and rest-
ing there in 2008. The value of this indicator on medium-skill
jobs was relatively stable in 2002–2008, which was followed
by a one percentage point jump in 2010 and a slight further in-
crease in 2012. For low-skill jobs, mean-based overeducation
jumped more than one percentage point in 2004, fluctuated
near 15 per cent until 2008 and started gradually dropping in
the following years, in 2012 falling below its level in 2002.
4 Results
In this section, we first discuss the relationship between the
JPI and the SMI. Then we move to studying the effects from
the JPI on individual-level mismatch. Summary statistics of
the variables used in this section are available in the Ap-
pendix, Table 11 for macro-level models and Tables 12 and
13 for multi-level models.
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Fig. 6 Average Incidence of Over-/Undereducation in Europe by Skill
Level of Jobs. See notes to Fig. 4. Recall that overeducation in high-
skill jobs and undereducation in low-skill jobs is undefined when the
ISCO-based measure of mismatch is used.
4.1 Polarization and Macro-Level Skills Mismatch
We first estimate the models of the SMI and the JPI separately.
We use a linear model with country-level random intercepts
based on a panel of 24 countries14 observed in 2002–2012.
The results (see Table 2) suggest that there is no relationship
between the two indices. The SMI is inversely related to
employment protection legislation (EPL) and pro-cyclical.
The JPI increases with per capita income and population
growth.
Single-equation results, however, may be biased, as they
do not take into account possible inter-relationship between
the two equations. Theoretically, one would expect that job
polarization increases the demand for workers at certain lev-
els of education, and in the absence of a supply response this
will lead to more mismatch, unless the supply of educated
workers was already polarized to a larger extent than avail-
able jobs. On the other hand, high levels of skills mismatch
in groups of occupations may also influence the pace of job
polarization, again abstracting from a supply response.
Simultaneous equations where endogenous variables ap-
pear on both sides of equations are typically estimated using
three-stage least squares (3SLS) (Zellner and Theil 1962).
We run a 3SLS-like simultaneous equations model for the
JPI and the SMI with country-level random effects corre-
lated across equations:
{
mit = γ0 + γ1pit + δxit + ϕyit + κi + εit
pit = α0 + α1mit + βxit + ψzit + λi + ξit , (7)
14Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Only in these 24 countries was it
possible to define employment protection legislation, which is one of
the independent variables in the model discussed below.
Table 2 Results of Single-Equation Models of the SMI and the JPI






log(GDP per capita) 0.587∗∗
Population growth 0.583∗∗∗
Crisis (2008–09) 1.475∗∗∗
Aftercrisis (2011–12) −0.690∗∗∗ −0.641∗∗∗
Constant 27.823∗∗∗ −0.809 0.818∗∗∗
Random Effects:
Constant 3.008 0.407 0.420
(0.486) (0.084) (0.086)
N 264 264 264
LR test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Residual ICC 0.512 0.200 0.219
(0.085) (0.069) (0.074)
AIC 1392 684 674
BIC 1417 705 695
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 EPL is employment protection
legislation. Most data on EPL were taken from OECD. EPL data for
Estonia (2002–2007) and Slovenia (2002–2007) were taken from Tarvid
(2011, p. 96). EPL data for Iceland and Luxembourg in 2002–2007 were
set equal to the available data for 2008–2012. EPL data for Sweden in
2005 and 2006 were set equal to the available data in the surrounding
years.All other data taken from ILO (2013c). Random effects computed
at country-level. Parentheses contain standard errors. ICC is intra-class
correlation.
where i is country index and t is year index. We use con-
ditional mixed process estimator with multilevel random
effects and coefficients (Roodman 2011) for that purpose.
Table 3 shows that the JPI negatively and statistically signif-
icantly affects the SMI, but the reverse effect is close to zero
and not significant. The size of the effect from the JPI on the
SMI is close to −1.8.
Further analysis15 shows that the SMI is related to the low-
skill occupation parameter (5l) of the JPI more strongly
than to its high-skill occupation parameter (5h), although
both are highly significant.
None of SMI components is significantly correlated with
5h. At the same time, all three components of the SMI are
significantly correlated with 5l.16 To get a clearer picture of
the relationship between the components of both indices, we
run the following three-equation seemingly unrelated regres-







∣∣∣∣ = αi + βi5h + γi5l + εi , i = 1, 2, 3. (8)
15Model (7) without country-level random effects and with the two
JPI components included on the right-hand side of the SMI equation
instead of the JPI itself estimated by seemingly unrelated regression,
not reported.
16The correlations are −0.17, −0.11 and −0.21 for the primary-,
secondary- and tertiary-education components of the SMI, respectively.
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Table 3 Results of Simultaneous Equations Models for the JPI and the
SMI
(1) (2)




GDP growth 0.176 0.163
log(GDP per capita) 0.689∗∗
Population growth 0.590∗∗∗
Crisis (2008–09) 2.023 2.009
Aftercrisis (2011–12) −0.694∗∗∗ −0.621∗∗
Constant 26.892∗∗∗ −1.030 26.759∗∗∗ 1.258∗
Random Effects:
Constant 2.813 0.398 2.826 0.391




Residual CEC 0.545∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
AIC 2070 2058
BIC 2123 2112
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 See notes under Table 2. CEC is
cross-equation correlation.
Table 4 Results of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of SMI Compo-




















5h −0.489∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.513∗∗∗
5l −1.292∗∗∗ −0.143 −1.152∗∗∗
R2 0.0470 0.0024 0.0657
Breusch–Pagan test of independence of equations has a p-value of
0.0000.
Table 4 shows that changes in low-skill occupation share
have a more than twice larger effect on the components of
the SMI than changes in high-skill occupation share. At the
same time, the low-skill component of the JPI most strongly
affects the primary-education component of the SMI, and
the high-skill component of the JPI most strongly affects the
tertiary-education component of the SMI, although the effect
size from 5h is nearly the same on both the primary- and
tertiary-education components of the SMI.
The results, thus, suggest that labour markets have a
greater difficulty in accommodating changes in the share of
low-skill occupations, which are more strongly related to
skills mismatch, which can be explained by several factors.
Given that the supply of high-skill workers is in general on
an upward trend, this may mitigate the effects of job polar-
ization on skills mismatch for high-skill occupations. It may
also be that education systems are relatively responsive at
higher levels of education, in part because the upward trend
is supported by policies in many countries. Other explana-
tions are related to the behaviour of workers, which will be





















































































Fig. 7 Sensitivity of JPI–SMI Relationship Depending on the Lag
Length in JPI Definition. Each point on the lines represents the value
of the coefficient of the JPI or the SMI in the respective equation of (7).
The system (7), in the specification (3) as shown in Table 3, was esti-
mated on a subset of countries where it was possible to include all lags
from 3rd to 10th in 2002–2012. These countries are Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Because it was not
possible to include all countries that were included in the model whose
results were discussed above due to data unavailability, the values of
the coefficients shown in the figure are different from those shown in
Table 3.
We will now analyse how sensitive the above results are to
alternative definitions of the JPI. Recall that we used the 5
operator, that is, five lags of data in (5). We will now analyse
how the coefficients in (7) depend on whether the JPI was
defined using operators 3, 4, ... 10 defined analogously
to (4) – that is, from three lags (reference to short-term aver-
age) through ten lags (reference to long-term average). The
dataset does not allow us to go beyond 10 lags (as there are no
data before 1992), and we continue estimating (7) on years
2002–2012. The dataset also does not contain data for all
countries in 1992–1997, so to keep the following analysis
consistent, we take only those countries where we have data
from 1992 through 1997 on which to compute longer lags in
JPI definition (see the list of countries in the note to Fig. 7).
Figure 7 shows that the effect from the JPI on the SMI
is the strongest when compared to short-term averages (lag
lengths of 3–4), but the closer we move to the long-term ref-
erence value, the less pronounced the relationship becomes.
Even when the JPI has 10 lags, however, its effect on the
SMI remains significant. The effect from the SMI on the JPI
increases somewhat with lag length, but remains modest (as
compared to the reverse effect) and insignificant.
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4.2 Polarization and Individual-Level Skills Mismatch
Overeducation and undereducation may be related to job po-
larization in various ways. For example, if the growth of
high-skill occupations outpaces the supply of workers at this
level of skills, undereducation can be expected to rise. On the
other hand, overeducation may rise if high-skilled workers
cannot find appropriate jobs and increasingly compete for
jobs usually taken by those with a lower level of education.
In this section, we will study how the risk of mismatch
at individual level depends on the polarization of the occu-
pational structure. We will use the nominal (ISCO-based)
and the statistical (mean-based) definitions of mismatch of
both overeducation and undereducation that were introduced
before.
Several methods are possible in studying the determinants
of over- and undereducation on cross-sectional data, such as
that available from ESS. The simplest is to run logit/probit
models separately for two dummies representing overedu-
cation and undereducation, respectively. A more elaborate
method is to create a three-category variable and run a multi-
nomial logit/probit model with a base category of full match
between the individual and the job.
We will use multi-level mixed effects logistic model. This
model allows for intra-cluster correlation of observations by
assuming that they share common cluster-level random ef-
fects. The model allows for several levels of nested clusters,
and we will use two levels: individuals (the first level) will
be nested inside countries (the second level). This model
also allows for cluster-level random coefficients, i.e., sepa-
rate random effects of the variable within each cluster. We
will include random coefficients on the sex dummy in ag-
gregate (i.e., not sex-specific) models. All models will be
estimated by adaptive Gaussian quadrature with seven inte-
gration points. The models will be estimated on 30 coun-
tries: 24 used in Sect. 4.1, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania and Romania. The dependent variables will be
overeducation and undereducation defined by ISCO-based
and mean-based measures.
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is important for
micro-level models of mismatch. There might be unobserved
individual- or job-specific factors that, together with the ob-
served factors, make the worker a perfect candidate for his
or her job. Not controlling for such unobserved factors might
make results biased. For cross-sectional data17, unobserved
heterogeneity can be approximated by using a proxy for
ability (Cainarca and Sgobbi 2012; Chevalier 2003; Korpi
and Tåhlin 2009), splitting the sample into more homoge-
neous (e.g., in terms of earnings) sub-samples (Budría 2011;
McGuinness and Bennett 2007) or controlling for the envi-
17There are more options if panel data are available, but because ESS
is a cross-sectional dataset, these are not reviewed here.
ronment where the individual was raised (Korpi and Tåhlin
2009). Personality is another important source of unobserved
heterogeneity, but it was used by only two studies in the con-
text of mismatch (Blázquez and Budría 2012; Tarvid 2013).
Tarvid (2013) showed that personality is an important pre-
dictor of overeducation and frequently performs better than
ability.
Data on respondent’s personality are included in ESS data.
We will use it to control for unobserved heterogeneity.18 ESS
data contain 12 variables describing respondent’s personal-
ity. Each of them measures the extent to which the respondent
believes he/she resembles the description of a given trait. We
created 12 dummies indicating respondents who were “very
much like” the respective description. We then ran factor
analysis, which allowed us to combine these dummies in
three summated scales created by taking the average value
of the relevant dummies:
• Social orientation (important to be treated equally, follow
rules, help people and be loyal to friends)
• Achievement orientation (important to be rich, show abil-
ities, get respect and be successful)
• Openness to experience (important to be creative, try new
things, make decisions freely and seek adventures)
Each scale runs from 0 to 1, where larger values indicate bet-
ter representation of particular composite trait in the respon-
dent. Principal-component factor, iterated principal factor
and maximum-likelihood factor methods all gave the same
grouping after rotation, whether orthogonal or oblique. KMO
measure is between 0.80 and 0.90 for the whole sample and
each of the twelve dummies individually; Cronbach’s alphas
are between 0.60 and 0.65.
Other individual-level explanatory variables in the cur-
rent model were shown to be related to mismatch in other
studies (see Sect. 2) or are otherwise related to it. These can
be grouped into three categories. Personal characteristics,
besides personality variables, include general demograph-
ics (age and its square, sex dummy), dummies for being a
student or a disabled, immigrant background and education
level (only where mismatch is measured by the mean-based
criterion). Family characteristics include the number of chil-
dren, partner employment status, parental and partner’s ed-
ucation level and whether one of the parents is responsible
for supervising other employees (dummy). Finally, labour-
market characteristics include the type of domicile, firm size,
whether the respondent is responsible for supervising other
employees (dummy), unemployment experience with a du-
ration up to 3 months or up to 1 year (in a lifetime in both
cases, dummies) and working without a contract.
18Ideally, we would also include the ability variable defined by Tarvid
(2013), but it is impossible to construct it in all rounds due to conflicting
measures of respondent’s income in different rounds.
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The model also includes two macro-level country-specific
explanatory variables: the JPI and total unemployment. Time
fixed effects are represented by ESS rounds.
We will now analyse the effects from the variables of
main interest: the JPI, unemployment, sex and ESS rounds,
which are shown in Tables 5 (for overeducation) and 6 (for
undereducation). Four models are compared:
1. yict = α + βpct + γ t + (δ + ξc)fict + ζc + εict
2. yict = α + β(pct × t) + (δ + ξc)fict + ζc + εict
3. yict = α + βpct + γ t + (δ + ξc)fict + ζc + κx + εict
4. yict = α + β(pct × t) + (δ + ξc)fict + ζc + κx + εict ,
where y is mismatch state (overeducation or undereducation,
depending on the model), p is the JPI, f is the female dummy
(note that it has both a fixed coefficient, δ, and a country-
level random coefficient, ξc), t denotes ESS rounds, vector x
contains all individual-specific variables other than sex and
the unemployment rate of a country in the given ESS round,
and ζc are country-level random intercepts. Indices i, c and t
denote individuals, countries and ESS rounds, respectively.
This set-up, thus, allows to compare the effect on individual’s
mismatch coming purely from the JPI (controlling for sex
and time fixed effects) and the changes in the effect after
controlling for other relevant variables included in vector x.
The same four models are also run separately for men and
women (without the sex dummy, of course). Of these models,
model (3) is the main model.
At first, the results from model (3) seem to say that the
JPI is irrelevant for individual-level mismatch: the only sig-
nificant effect on the total sample is the positive effect on
mean-based overeducation. Model (1), however, shows all
effects from the JPI on the total sample as not significant, so
the significant effect in the mean-based overeducation model
appeared only after including other explanatory variables.
We hypothesise that there in fact is an effect, but it is
different for subgroups of individuals and, thus, cancels out.
We, thus, set two hypotheses: (1) the effect is different for
men and women and (2) it differs across ESS rounds. Sex-
specific models and models with interactions between the
JPI and ESS rounds (models (2) and (4)) on the total sample
allow us to investigate this issue further.
The first hypothesis does not hold in case of undereduca-
tion: Table 6 shows that there is no effect for males or females
in models (1) and (3) for both mismatch measures. However,
we find support for this hypothesis in case of overeducation
(Table 5).The JPI increases the risk of overeducation of males
but does not affect it for females. Note that adding other ex-
planatory variables decreases the odds ratio of ISCO-based
overeducation but increases it for mean-based overeducation,
but the changes are certainly not radical. Summing up the re-
sults from both measures, we can conclude that a one-point
increase in the JPI increases the risk of overeducation for
males by 4 to 5 per cent, depending on the measure.
The second hypothesis generally holds in case of ISCO-
based mismatch measure. In both models (2) and (4), we can
see that the effect from the JPI was arguably positive to the
individual in the first three rounds (i.e., in 2002–2007) in
the sense that in countries with a higher JPI the probability
of overeducation was lower but that of undereducation was
higher. The absolute size of the effect, however, was much
smaller in the second and third rounds (2004–2007) than in
the first round (2002–2003). In contrast, the fourth round
(2008–2009) and, to some extent, the fifth round (2010–
2011) have a contrasting effect: countries with a higher JPI
can be associated with a generally higher overeducation. The
situation with undereducation was somewhat different: the
effect is still positive in the fourth round (in model (4)), but
then in the fifth round, it went down to being insignificant
(in model (4)) or negative (in model (2)). Most likely, these
effects come from the crisis, but note that in model (4), we do
control for unemployment rate, which should accommodate
some of the effects from the crisis on mismatch.
In case of mean-based mismatch measure, the second hy-
pothesis also holds but to a smaller extent, because most
effects on undereducation are not significant. For overeduca-
tion, effects become significant only after non-sex individual-
level controls are added (note that unemployment is not sig-
nificant). Again, we can observe that in the first two rounds,
the JPI increased mean-based overeducation, but the effect
disappeared in the following two rounds, then became risk-
decreasing in the fifth round (2010–2011) and finally, in the
most recent round (2012–2013), it turned back to be risk-
increasing. This is the reason why the overall effect from the
JPI on mean-based overeducation is positive and significant.
As just noted, the effect of the JPI on mean-based overe-
ducation is generally positive, and its behaviour during the
global financial crisis (2008–2009) and immediately after-
wards (2010–2011) appeared to be a temporary deviation,
which ended in 2012–2013. Can we see similar behaviour
in the effect of the JPI on ISCO-based overeducation? We
would answer in the affirmative, as the overall effect peaked
in the crisis years and afterwards started diminishing and
moving to below one. The same cannot be said about the
effect on ISCO-based undereducation: no clear indication
of future moving directions can be inferred from the effects
shown in Table 6.
Tables 5 and 6 also enable us to combine both hypothe-
ses and see how sex-specific effects from the JPI change
over time. The overall effects on ISCO-based overeducation
are clearly driven by the effect on females, as once we con-
trol for individual-level factors and unemployment rate, the
only significant effect for males is observed during the crisis.
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Table 5 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Overeducation: Key Effects
Total, ISCO-Based Measure Male, ISCO-Based Measure Female, ISCO-Based Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
JPI 1.020 1.010 1.067∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗ 0.980 0.978
× ESSR1 0.790∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 0.918 0.717∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
× ESSR2 0.964∗ 0.979 1.011 1.026 0.911∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗
× ESSR3 0.916∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.958 0.950 0.880∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗
× ESSR4 1.108∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 1.057∗ 1.033
× ESSR5 1.089∗∗∗ 1.044 1.095∗∗ 1.019 1.087∗∗ 1.067∗
× ESSR6 1.031 0.976 1.082∗∗ 1.000 0.994 0.964
Unempl. 10.065∗∗∗ 46.582∗∗∗ 55.834∗∗∗ 296.734∗∗∗ 2.403 9.175∗∗∗
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
ESSR2 1.153∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗ 1.101 1.152∗∗ 1.139∗∗
ESSR3 1.114∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗ 1.065 1.038 1.162∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗
ESSR4 1.242∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗
ESSR5 1.350∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗
ESSR6 1.452∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 1.359∗∗∗ 1.469∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗
Female 1.273∗∗∗ 1.275∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗
Constant 0.072∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
Random Effects
Female 0.243 0.244 0.247 0.246
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Const. 0.508 0.493 0.491 0.490 0.519 0.502 0.497 0.499 0.508 0.490 0.505 0.492
(0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068)
N 121731 121731 121731 121731 62980 62980 62980 62980 58751 58751 58751 58751
LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 75421 75465 74072 74099 36282 36313 35824 35840 39168 39174 38224 38230
BIC 75518 75562 74519 74546 36355 36386 36222 36238 39240 39246 38619 38625
Total, Mean-Based Measure Male, Mean-Based Measure Female, Mean-Based Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
JPI 1.015 1.034∗∗ 1.036∗∗ 1.042∗∗ 0.993 1.023
× ESSR1 1.029 1.185∗∗∗ 1.069 1.214∗∗∗ 0.983 1.142∗∗∗
× ESSR2 1.002 1.048∗∗∗ 1.020 1.059∗∗∗ 0.978 1.036
× ESSR3 0.990 1.012 1.042 1.053 0.927∗∗ 0.963
× ESSR4 1.023 0.969 1.005 0.945 1.041 0.991
× ESSR5 1.033 0.942∗∗ 0.998 0.899∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗ 0.980
× ESSR6 1.038∗ 1.051∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.059∗ 1.007 1.037
Unempl. 0.714 1.054 2.221 2.203 0.286 0.587
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
ESSR2 0.984 0.926∗∗ 0.943 0.878∗∗∗ 1.030 0.993
ESSR3 0.947∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.923∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.979 0.884∗∗
ESSR4 0.965 0.820∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 1.024 0.888∗∗
ESSR5 1.006 0.822∗∗∗ 0.930∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗ 0.924
ESSR6 1.010 0.907∗∗∗ 0.975 0.834∗∗∗ 1.058 1.002
Female 0.874∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗
Constant 0.181∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
Random Effects
Female 0.056 0.053 0.070 0.072
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Const. 0.065 0.061 0.253 0.251 0.069 0.064 0.264 0.262 0.077 0.067 0.224 0.223
(0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.035) (0.016) (0.016) (0.037) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.033)
N 114869 114869 114869 114869 59079 59079 59079 59079 55790 55790 55790 55790
LR test 0.088 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 1.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 95072 95075 81510 81526 50583 50584 43461 43474 44491 44485 38073 38077
BIC 95168 95171 81974 81990 50655 50656 43874 43888 44562 44557 38484 38488
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results shown. Likelihood ratio (LR) test compares the given models with the corresponding models
fit by standard logistic regression; its p-value is reported. ESSR is ESS round. ESS round 1 was fielded in 2002–2003, round 2 in 2004–2005, round
3 in 2006–2007, round 4 in 2008–2009, round 5 in 2010–2011 and round 6 in 2012–2013. As stated in the main text, models (2) and (4) include
the interaction between the JPI and ESS rounds but do not include the respective main effects.
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Table 6 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Undereducation: Key Effects
Total, ISCO-Based Measure Male, ISCO-Based Measure Female, ISCO-Based Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
JPI 0.994 0.985 0.988 0.981 1.004 0.992
× ESSR1 1.285∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗
× ESSR2 1.041∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.027∗ 1.043∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗
× ESSR3 1.022 1.065∗∗∗ 1.003 1.049∗ 1.048 1.089∗∗∗
× ESSR4 0.974 1.059∗∗∗ 1.011 1.118∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗ 1.001
× ESSR5 0.874∗∗∗ 0.985 0.865∗∗∗ 0.994 0.882∗∗∗ 0.976
× ESSR6 0.982 0.977 0.956∗∗ 0.945∗∗ 1.010 1.010
Unempl. 0.924 0.019∗∗∗ 0.353∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 2.174 0.028∗∗∗
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
ESSR2 0.889∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗ 0.947 0.852∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
ESSR3 0.836∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
ESSR4 0.806∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗
ESSR5 0.696∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
ESSR6 0.667∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
Female 0.815∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗ 0.841∗∗
Constant 0.540∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.889 0.752∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.910 0.812 0.467∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.797 0.625∗∗∗
Random Effects
Female 0.348 0.347 0.372 0.367
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049)
Const. 0.535 0.527 0.532 0.529 0.543 0.539 0.542 0.546 0.475 0.469 0.478 0.464
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062)
N 121731 121731 121731 121731 62980 62980 62980 62980 58751 58751 58751 58751
LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 141545 141753 136313 136903 74725 74799 71771 71997 66821 66962 64393 64766
BIC 141642 141850 136759 137350 74797 74872 72169 72395 66893 67034 64789 65161
Total, Mean-Based Measure Male, Mean-Based Measure Female, Mean-Based Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
JPI 1.012 1.014 1.008 1.026 1.016 1.003
× ESSR1 1.068∗∗ 0.942∗ 0.995 0.880∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 1.016
× ESSR2 1.009 0.974 0.985 0.958∗ 1.042∗∗ 0.991
× ESSR3 1.007 1.035 0.983 1.043 1.033 1.033
× ESSR4 0.977 1.039 0.983 1.051 0.969 1.032
× ESSR5 1.011 1.086∗∗∗ 1.027 1.105∗∗ 0.988 1.071
× ESSR6 1.017 1.025 1.033 1.073∗ 0.997 0.982
Unempl. 2.959 2.605 1.080 1.444 5.801∗ 3.387
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
ESSR2 0.932∗∗ 0.989 0.958 1.037 0.910∗∗ 0.943
ESSR3 0.940∗ 1.068∗ 0.982 1.145∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗ 0.989
ESSR4 0.930∗∗ 1.087∗∗ 0.993 1.180∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.994
ESSR5 0.929∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 0.998 1.212∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 1.003
ESSR6 0.928∗∗ 1.084∗∗ 1.031 1.267∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.919
Female 0.995 0.994 1.192∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗
Constant 0.156∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
Random Effects
Female 0.121 0.121 0.169 0.168
(0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031)
Const. 0.154 0.153 0.382 0.377 0.172 0.174 0.397 0.394 0.130 0.129 0.372 0.365
(0.024) (0.024) (0.051) (0.051) (0.027) (0.028) (0.054) (0.053) (0.022) (0.022) (0.051) (0.050)
N 114869 114869 114869 114869 59079 59079 59079 59079 55790 55790 55790 55790
LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 88695 88697 73005 73004 45669 45669 37279 37286 43019 43026 35721 35721
BIC 88791 88793 73469 73468 45741 45741 37693 37699 43091 43097 36131 36132
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results shown. Likelihood ratio (LR) test compares the given models with the corresponding models
fit by standard logistic regression; its p-value is reported. ESSR is ESS round. ESS round 1 was fielded in 2002–2003, round 2 in 2004–2005, round
3 in 2006–2007, round 4 in 2008–2009, round 5 in 2010–2011 and round 6 in 2012–2013. As stated in the main text, models (2) and (4) include
the interaction between the JPI and ESS rounds but do not include the respective main effects.
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Note that this contradicts the overall effect direction for males
and females, which was positive and significant for the for-
mer but not significant for the latter. The overall effect for
males, thus, seems to be purely driven by the crisis, while
the absence of the overall effect for females by the pre-crisis
and after-crisis (round 5) effects cancelling out. The overall
effects on mean-based overeducation for males and females,
in contrast, are in line with what is observed over time: the
interactions are mostly significant for men, while only the
round-one effect is significant for women.
ISCO-based undereducation analysed by sex shows that
most interactions are significant for both males and females,
so the insignificance of their overall effects stems purely
from the dynamics over time wiping out the average effect.
The situation with mean-based undereducation somewhat re-
sembles that with ISCO-based overeducation, with two dif-
ferences: interactions in case of men (but not women) are
mostly significant but neither for the male nor for the female
sub-sample does it lead to a significant overall effect.
Two sensitivity checks are required at this point. Firstly,
we ran sex-specific models with general JPI, studying how
the general level of polarization affects the situation with
each sex. Would the situation change if in sex-specific mod-
els, we instead use sex-specific JPI? As Tables 9 and 10 in
the Appendix show, making this change indeed changes the
results somewhat. Firstly, sex-specific JPI no longer affects
the risk of ISCO-based overeducation for men. Secondly,
it now decreases the chances of ISCO-based undereducation
for females and increases the chances of mean-based undere-
ducation for males. Overall, however, the directions and sizes
of effects in general JPI and sex-specific JPI models are simi-
lar. Moreover, the values of their information criteria are very
close, so we cannot conclude that using a sex-specific JPI im-
proves the explanatory power of models.19 It this case, we
would argue, the effects of sex-specific JPI should be treated
as a scientific fact of general interest, while economic policy
should be based on the models using general JPI. Otherwise,
we would effectively consider the male labour market and
the female labour market as two non-intersecting markets
guided by their own mechanisms, which, we believe, does
not reflect the true situation, at least regarding mismatch and
job polarization. Further research would add clarity to this
issue.
Secondly, the same check for sensitivity to JPI lag length
is required, as we did in Sect. 4.1. Figure 8 shows its re-
sults on the subset of 13 countries where the JPI with up
to 10 lags can be defined. These results are in line with our
above observations. While the effect from the JPI on ISCO-
based mismatch is not significant for most lag lengths, it
quickly moves away from 1.0 with lag lengths increasing
19This holds not only for models (3) and (4), but also for models (1)
and (2), whose results are not reported in case of sex-specific JPI.
and are close to being significant when the JPI is defined
with 10 lags (i.e., the current situation in the labour market
is compared to the average long-term situation there). As we
stated above, these nearly-significant effects are negative for
overeducation and positive for undereducation. The effect on
mean-based overeducation is positive and significant for any
lag length from 3 to 10, while that on mean-based undered-
ucation is not significant.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that the relationship between
polarization and skills mismatch is an empirical matter,
which is dependent on the prevailing levels of skills mis-
match, supply responses to changes in the demand for edu-
cated workers and the pace of imbalanced job polarization –
the extent to which the share of high-skill jobs and low-skill
jobs grow relatively to each other at the expense of medium-
skill jobs. We analysed the relationship between imbalanced
polarization and skills mismatch at both the macroeconomic
and the microeconomic level. We introduced a job polariza-
tion index, and used a skills mismatch index at the macroeco-
nomic level alongside traditional measures of overeducation
and undereducation at the microeconomic level.
Descriptive evidence showed that polarization has been
slowing down recently (as shown by a near-zero or negative
JPI in half of European countries, although the heterogeneity
in JPI values is high), while skills mismatch at the macroe-
conomic level rebounded after a decline during the crisis.
Skills mismatch at the microeconomic level reflects a stable
tendency in many European countries for overeducation to
rise and undereducation to fall.
The main result of the regression analysis at the macroe-
conomic level is that imbalanced job polarization negatively
affects the mismatch between skills demand and skills sup-
ply proxied by level of educational attainment, but there is
no statistically significant reverse effect. In other words, job
polarization seems to be the principal force in the labour mar-
ket, which influences the extent of skills mismatch alongside
supply trends such as the increase in workers with higher lev-
els of education. The negative relationship reflects that skills
mismatch is to an important extent driven by what happens
to low-skill occupations. The trend towards a growing share
of high-skill occupations by itself raises the SMI, but the
SMI is more strongly related to changes in the share of low-
skill occupations as captured in the JPI. Our interpretation
of these results is that labour markets have greater difficulty
in accommodating changes in the share of low-skill occupa-
tions. This may be due to the upward trend in the supply of
educated workers, the responsiveness of education systems
at different levels of education, as well as microeconomic ex-
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Fig. 8 Sensitivity of the Effects from JPI on Individual-Level Mismatch on the Lag Length in JPI Definition. Each point on the lines represents
the value of the odds ratio of JPI on overeducation or undereducation, measured by the ISCO- or mean-based measure. Model (3) was estimated
with Laplace approximation. Same 13 countries as in Fig. 7 were used for the same reason and with the same implications as stated in the notes to
Fig. 7.
planations based on the options of workers at different levels
of education.
At the microeconomic level, results from multi-level lo-
gistic models show that imbalanced job polarization has no
overall effect on ISCO-based mismatch or mean-based un-
dereducation, but increases mean-based overeducation. A
closer analysis identified that the lack of statistical signif-
icance in the models of ISCO-based mismatch came from
a reversal of the relationship during the global financial cri-
sis of 2008–2009 and the following two years. In non-crisis
years, the JPI decreases ISCO-based overeducation and in-
creases ISCO-based undereducation. The same effect direc-
tions were shown by further sensitivity analysis.
The results are consistent for both macro-level and
individual-level mismatch in that higher or more imbalanced
job polarization (i.e., stronger upgrading) tends to dampen
mismatch. Note that when we claim that polarization damp-
ens mismatch at the individual level, we focus on ISCO-based
overeducation.
One could then ask two questions. Firstly, why not take
into account the effect on undereducation? While in principle
undereducation is a type of mismatch similar to overeduca-
tion, undereducation may be less problematic to the extent
that it can be remedied by additional education and train-
ing, does not lead to depressive symptoms as opposed to
overeducation (Bracke et al. 2013) and to lower job satisfac-
tion as opposed to overeducation (Peiró et al. 2010).20 When
the JPI decreases the risk of ISCO-based overeducation (in
non-crisis years), even if it also increases the exposure to
ISCO-based undereducation, the exposure to mismatch with
negative consequences to the individual becomes lower.
Secondly, the effect on ISCO-based overeducation is the
opposite of the effect on mean-based overeducation, so why
are we focusing on the former? ISCO-based mismatch is
conceptually closer to the SMI (and the JPI) in that it also
considers three education levels. In contrast, the statistical (in
this case, the mean-based) measure operates on the basis of
20The effects on earnings have more nuances and controversies. For in-
stance, the standard result is that the wages of the over-(under-)educated
are lower (higher) than for the well-matched at the same education level,
but higher (lower) than for the well-matched in the same job (Korpi and
Tåhlin 2009; Rubb 2003; Verhaest and Omey 2012), although lack of
the difference in the effect magnitude and significance was also reported
(Tsai 2010). There is some evidence that the overeducated have higher
wage growth than the undereducated (Rubb 2006), but this finding is
again not universal (Groeneveld and Hartog 2004; Korpi and Tåhlin
2009).
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years, and not levels, of education. Different directions of the
JPI effects can be explained as follows. In case of the ISCO-
based measure, higher levels and/or greater skewness of po-
larization allow the secondary-educated to move to higher-
level positions (for which they might be undereducated), as
demand increases, instead of moving to elementary occupa-
tions (which require primary education only). In case of the
mean-based measure, higher levels and/or greater skewness
of polarization foster investment in further education (which
takes time, but not necessarily leads to a change in education
level), which increases the proportion of the employees with
too many years of education in a given occupation group.
At the same time, there is no effect on mean-based under-
education, showing that upward mobility is more restricted
for workers with lower values of years of education than the
average in their occupation group. There is, thus, no contra-
diction in these results – they merely allow for a consideration
of the labour market from different angles.
There are several limitations of this work. One of them
is the definition of the JPI, which consists of a pure polar-
ization and an imbalance component, so that a change in the
JPI cannot be readily attributed to one of these. Although
we argued that this is not problematic, there might be some
relationship between both components that is hidden in the
current set-up. Secondly, there are drawbacks in each of the
individual-level mismatch measures. By construction of the
ISCO-based measure, for instance, overeducation is unde-
fined for high-skill positions. The mean-based measure, in
turn, endogenises the changing skill composition of the pop-
ulation, which makes the interpretation of trends less trans-
parent. Thirdly, jobs are classified into only three categories
– low-, medium- and high-skill – while a more elaborate
classification might yield additional insights.
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Appendix
The remaining results of the multi-level models are shown in
Tables 7 and 8. These will be discussed along the three groups
of variables: personal characteristics, family characteristics
and labour-market factors.
There is weak dependence of overeducation on age, while
undereducation has a U-shaped relationship with it. A more
careful analysis (not reported) shows that individuals aged
25–34 are hurt most by mismatch, having both higher overed-
ucation risk and lower undereducation chances on both mea-
sures. Disability and the student status increase both types of
mismatch on the ISCO-based measure, while on the mean-
based measure they increase only the exposure to overeduca-
tion but not undereducation. Of migrants, the highest (lowest)
risk of overeducation (undereducation) is faced by those from
former Soviet Union countries followed by Latin American,
Asian and African and Central and Eastern European immi-
grants. Being an ethnic minority or a second-generation im-
migrant has less pronounced effects on mismatch – but note
how minorities are more exposed to undereducation than the
fully natives. Achievement orientation is a beneficial per-
sonality trait, because it decreases the risk of ISCO-based
overeducation and increases the chances of ISCO-based un-
dereducation. Openness to experience decreases ISCO-based
overeducation risk but increases mean-based overeducation
risk, while social orientation is not significant in any model
but is close to the border of significance for ISCO-based
overeducation. Finally, a tertiary degree increases the risk
of becoming overeducated at the expense of the chances of
becoming undereducated, according to the mean-based mea-
sure.
Having one child decreases overeducation on the ISCO-
based measure, and this is the only strong effect from the
number of children. Having a partner with any employment
status has a positive effect on the labour market status of the
respondent on the ISCO-based measure (lower overeduca-
tion, higher undereducation); the effects on the mean-based
measure of mismatch are more limited, especially for un-
dereducation. Higher education of parents or partner gener-
ally tends to increase overeducation and decrease undered-
ucation (again, limited effects are observed for mean-based
undereducation). The likely mechanisms behind that are in-
tergenerational mobility of education level and homophily
(McPherson et al. 2001) (in case of partner). As the effects
from partner’s higher education are stronger, the effects from
homophily tend to be stronger. A similar effect is from a par-
ent supervising others in their job, except that it does not
affect the risk of ISCO-based overeducation.
Larger labour markets do not necessarily lead to better
match – they do decrease ISCO-based undereducation, but
do not affect ISCO-based overeducation risk and increase
mean-based mismatch. ISCO-based mismatch generally de-
creases with firm size, but the effect on mean-based mis-
match is U-shaped in case of overeducation and inverse U-
shaped in case of undereducation. Respondents supervising
other employees benefit from lower exposure to overeduca-
tion and higher chances of undereducation. Unemployment
experience (in a lifetime) has different effects depending
on its length. Three-month unemployment experience raises
the risk of overeducation and decreases the exposure to un-
dereducation. Twelve-month (long-term) unemployment ex-
perience also increases the risk of overeducation, but less
strongly than three-month unemployment, and increases the
exposure to ISCO-based undereducation but does not affect
mean-based undereducation. Working without a written con-
tract generally increases overeducation risk, but has limited
effects on undereducation.
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Table 7 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Overeducation: Non-Key Effects
ISCO-Based Measure Mean-Based Measure
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Personal Characteristics
Age 1.003 1.006 1.005 0.990∗ 0.993 0.991
Age2/100 0.987∗ 0.987 0.980∗∗ 1.001 1.001 0.998
Student 1.192∗∗∗ 1.153∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗ 2.009∗∗∗
Disabled 1.072∗∗ 1.073∗ 1.070∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗ 1.091∗∗
Immigrant Background (rel. to Native)
Minority 0.977 0.979 0.975 1.027 1.066 0.989
Parent-immigrant 0.998 0.944 1.048 1.045 1.016 1.075
Both parents immigrants 1.038 0.954 1.128 1.169∗∗ 1.062 1.290∗∗∗
Immigrant from Central and Eastern Europe 2.071∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 2.531∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗ 1.657∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗
Immigrant from former Soviet Union 2.178∗∗∗ 1.775∗∗∗ 2.520∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 1.535∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗
Immigrant from Latin America/Africa/Asia 2.122∗∗∗ 1.936∗∗∗ 2.337∗∗∗ 2.096∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 2.298∗∗∗
Immigrant from other European countries 1.209∗∗∗ 1.048 1.372∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗ 1.447∗∗∗
Immigrant from other countries 1.455∗∗ 1.465 1.453∗ 1.175 1.237 1.106
Personality Traits
Social orientation 1.098 1.153 1.055 1.044 1.033 1.055
Achievement orientation 0.855∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗ 0.907 0.971 1.007 0.943
Openness to experience 0.885∗∗ 0.945 0.830∗∗ 1.135∗∗ 1.099 1.165∗∗
Education (rel. to Secondary education)
Primary 0.132∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
Tertiary 4.457∗∗∗ 4.432∗∗∗ 4.534∗∗∗
Family Characteristics
Number of Children (rel. to No children)
1 0.917∗∗∗ 0.915∗ 0.912∗∗ 1.026 1.043 1.011
2 0.965 0.937 0.989 1.009 1.035 0.981
3+ 1.022 1.043 1.016 1.019 0.996 1.048
Partner Employment Status (rel. to No partner)
Unemployed 0.814∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.909∗ 0.936∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 0.917
Employed 0.887∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.971
Supervising others 0.869∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.956 0.890∗∗ 1.001
Parental and Partner Effects
Higher education, mother 0.944 0.984 0.917 1.046 1.042 1.038
Higher education, father 1.095∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗ 1.050 1.080∗∗∗ 1.039 1.130∗∗∗
Higher education, partner 1.139∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗
Parent supervises others 1.028 1.000 1.053 1.107∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗
Labour-Market Factors
Domicile (rel. to Rural)
Big city 0.971 0.947 1.003 1.107∗∗∗ 1.037 1.209∗∗∗
Small city 0.967 0.941∗ 1.000 0.978 0.965 1.011
Firm Size (rel. to < 10 employees)
10–24 0.989 1.019 0.973 0.800∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗
25–99 0.957 1.077∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
100–499 0.916∗∗∗ 0.940 0.906∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗
500+ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
Works as supervisor 0.665∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 1.026
Was unemployed for 3 months 1.297∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗
Was unemployed for 1 year 1.160∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ 1.131∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗
No written contract 1.166∗∗∗ 1.089 1.241∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗ 1.098 1.083
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results from model (3) shown.
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Table 8 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Undereducation: Non-Key Effects
ISCO-Based Measure Mean-Based Measure
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Personal Characteristics
Age 0.976∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 1.009∗ 1.000 1.017∗∗
Age2/100 1.044∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗
Student 1.300∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 1.022
Disabled 1.075∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 1.048∗ 1.021 1.051 0.995
Immigrant Background (rel. to Native)
Minority 1.155∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗ 1.076 1.171∗∗
Parent-immigrant 1.067∗∗ 1.116∗∗ 1.020 0.987 1.011 0.968
Both parents immigrants 1.085∗ 1.160∗∗ 1.008 0.991 0.903 1.100
Immigrant from Central and Eastern Europe 0.873∗∗∗ 1.050 0.697∗∗∗ 0.883 0.945 0.818∗
Immigrant from former Soviet Union 0.671∗∗∗ 0.800∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.835∗ 0.954 0.775∗∗
Immigrant from Latin America/Africa/Asia 0.814∗∗∗ 0.932 0.685∗∗∗ 0.918 0.975 0.829
Immigrant from other European countries 0.885∗∗∗ 1.041 0.719∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗ 1.214∗∗ 1.045
Immigrant from other countries 0.615∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗ 0.689∗ 0.991 0.826 1.139
Personality Traits
Social orientation 0.997 0.980 1.013 0.934 0.892 0.966
Achievement orientation 1.107∗∗ 1.142∗∗ 1.057 1.097 1.046 1.137
Openness to experience 0.982 0.983 0.981 1.076 1.210∗∗ 0.966
Education (rel. to Secondary education)
Primary 6.126∗∗∗ 6.587∗∗∗ 5.634∗∗∗
Tertiary 0.232∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
Family Characteristics
Number of Children (rel. to No children)
1 1.007 0.988 1.041 0.997 1.007 1.009
2 0.950∗∗ 0.953 0.957 0.957 0.964 0.967
3+ 0.947 0.951 0.950 0.939 0.953 0.939
Partner Employment Status (rel. to No partner)
Unemployed 1.316∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.065 1.163∗∗∗
Employed 1.170∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ 1.005 0.995 1.019
Supervising others 1.283∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.012 0.951 1.050
Parental and Partner Effects
Higher education, mother 0.673∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.906∗ 0.994 0.822∗∗
Higher education, father 0.610∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.992 1.019 0.981
Higher education, partner 0.439∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.995 1.025 0.962
Parent supervises others 0.915∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
Labour-Market Factors
Domicile (rel. to Rural)
Big city 0.837∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.010
Small city 0.917∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.063∗ 1.067∗
Firm Size (rel. to < 10 employees)
10–24 0.851∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 1.061 1.149∗∗∗
25–99 0.746∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗ 1.084∗∗
100–499 0.782∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 1.023 1.011 1.047
500+ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 1.053 1.028 1.099∗
Works as supervisor 1.182∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 1.294∗∗∗
Was unemployed for 3 months 0.882∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.952 0.871∗∗∗
Was unemployed for 1 year 1.092∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 1.068∗ 1.004 1.053 0.979
No written contract 1.012 1.112∗∗ 0.913∗∗ 0.998 1.056 0.947
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results of model (3) shown.
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Table 9 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Overeducation: Key Effects, Sex-Specific JPI
ISCO-Based Measure Mean-Based Measure
Male Female Male Female
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
JPI 0.994 1.025 1.030∗ 1.015
× Round 1 0.863∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗ 1.058
× Round 2 1.012 0.974 1.054∗∗∗ 1.032
× Round 3 0.893∗∗ 0.957 1.035 0.947
× Round 4 1.131∗∗∗ 1.038 0.926∗ 0.977
× Round 5 0.977 1.119∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.978
× Round 6 0.957 1.057∗∗ 1.043 1.024
Unemployment rate 77.176∗∗∗ 464.951∗∗∗ 1.630 6.155∗∗ 2.459 1.607 0.293 0.604
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
Round 2 1.126∗∗ 1.108∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.995
Round 3 1.035 1.146∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗
Round 4 1.170∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗
Round 5 1.191∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.925
Round 6 1.330∗∗∗ 1.503∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.998
Constant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
Random Effects
Constant 0.496 0.505 0.509 0.500 0.264 0.260 0.224 0.223
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
N 62980 62980 58751 58751 59079 59079 55790 55790
LR test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 35828 35830 38223 38255 43462 43479 38074 38080
BIC 36226 36228 38618 38650 43876 43893 38484 38490
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results shown.
Table 10 Odds Ratios After Multi-Level Mixed Effects Logit of Undereducation: Key Effects, Sex-Specific JPI
ISCO-Based Measure Mean-Based Measure
Male Female Male Female
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
JPI 1.009 0.973∗∗ 1.034∗ 0.995
× Round 1 1.235∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 1.034
× Round 2 1.034∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.970 0.975
× Round 3 1.056∗ 1.048∗∗ 1.073 1.014
× Round 4 1.136∗∗∗ 0.998 1.112∗∗ 1.017
× Round 5 1.010 0.964 1.107∗∗ 1.070
× Round 6 0.994 0.961∗∗ 1.070∗ 0.990
Unemployment rate 0.327∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 2.475 0.033∗∗∗ 1.103 1.875 6.202∗ 3.084
ESS Round (rel. to Round 1)
Round 2 0.929∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1.036 0.948
Round 3 0.918∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 0.991
Round 4 0.930∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 0.995
Round 5 0.771∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.006
Round 6 0.587∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 1.272∗∗∗ 0.917
Constant 0.894 0.828 0.803 0.635∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
Random Effects
Constant 0.538 0.549 0.481 0.468 0.397 0.395 0.372 0.366
(0.071) (0.072) (0.064) (0.062) (0.054) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050)
N 62980 62980 58751 58751 59079 59079 55790 55790
LR test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 71772 71993 64388 64818 37278 37281 35721 35720
BIC 72171 72391 64783 65214 37691 37695 36131 36131
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 Subset of results shown.
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Table 11 Summary Statistics for Macro-Level Models Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
5h 0.015 0.019 −0.048 0.099
5l −0.001 0.008 −0.031 0.028
Change in medium-level jobs 1.370 1.874 −4.220 9.380
Imbalance in high/low-level jobs 1.021 0.018 1.000 1.130
JPI 0.707 0.982 −2.224 5.068
SMI 15.630 5.060 1.200 30.100
EPL 2.593 0.442 1.677 4.095
GDP growth 1.797 3.327 −14.100 10.500
log(GDP per capita) 3.360 0.347 2.496 4.304
Population growth 0.526 0.554 −0.700 2.300
Table 12 Summary Statistics for Multi-Level Models, Categorical Variables (%)
ISCO-Based Models Mean-Based Models
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Number of kids:
0 67.89 68.56 67.19 67.77 68.42 67.07
1 16.45 15.45 17.52 16.56 15.56 17.62
2 12.30 12.35 12.25 12.34 12.42 12.26
3+ 3.35 3.64 3.05 3.34 3.61 3.05
Partner employment status:
No partner 32.16 30.69 33.74 32.05 30.60 33.59
Partner, not working 15.40 20.96 9.43 15.37 20.98 9.42
Partner, employed 39.26 39.02 39.52 39.36 39.12 39.60
Partner, supervisor 13.18 9.33 17.31 13.23 9.29 17.39
Type of domicile:
Big city 33.36 32.38 34.40 33.47 32.50 34.49
Town/small city 30.37 29.86 30.92 30.37 29.90 30.87
Rural 36.27 37.76 34.68 36.16 37.60 34.65
Firm size:
< 10 33.97 34.32 33.59 34.01 34.41 33.60
10–24 18.23 17.61 18.89 18.23 17.60 18.90
25–99 22.50 21.33 23.75 22.59 21.42 23.84
100–499 14.78 15.31 14.21 14.72 15.25 14.15
500+ 10.53 11.44 9.56 10.44 11.33 9.50
Immigrant background:
Fully native 80.15 80.17 80.14 80.44 80.46 80.41
Minority, no immigrant background 4.89 5.00 4.76 4.80 4.88 4.70
Local born, 1 parent-immigrant 4.89 4.77 5.02 4.86 4.74 4.98
Local born, 2 parents-immigrants 2.03 2.06 2.00 2.02 2.04 2.00
Immigrant from Central and Eastern Europe 1.75 1.73 1.76 1.75 1.76 1.73
Immigrant form former Soviet Union 1.07 0.87 1.27 1.07 0.87 1.28
Immigrant from Latin America/Africa/Asia 2.08 2.19 1.97 2.01 2.11 1.91
Immigrant from other European countries 2.87 2.98 2.76 2.80 2.90 2.69
Immigrant from other countries 0.27 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.30
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Table 13 Summary Statistics for Multi-Level Models, Binary and Continuous Variables
ISCO-Based Models Mean-Based Models
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Overeducation 0.098 0.087 0.109 0.145 0.153 0.137
(0.297) (0.282) (0.311) (0.352) (0.360) (0.343)
Undereducation 0.298 0.316 0.278 0.130 0.131 0.130
(0.457) (0.465) (0.448) (0.337) (0.337) (0.336)
Age 41.946 42.012 41.877 41.882 41.935 41.825
(12.018) (12.275) (11.736) (12.010) (12.266) (11.733)
Female 0.483 0.486
(0.500) (0.500)
Works as supervisor 0.323 0.386 0.256 0.319 0.381 0.254
(0.468) (0.487) (0.436) (0.466) (0.486) (0.436)
Student 0.037 0.032 0.043 0.037 0.031 0.043
(0.190) (0.175) (0.204) (0.188) (0.173) (0.203)
Disabled 0.142 0.134 0.152 0.141 0.133 0.151
(0.349) (0.340) (0.359) (0.349) (0.339) (0.358)
Was unemployed for 3 months 0.278 0.272 0.284 0.278 0.273 0.283
(0.448) (0.445) (0.451) (0.448) (0.446) (0.451)
Was unemployed for 1 year 0.095 0.085 0.106 0.095 0.085 0.106
(0.294) (0.280) (0.308) (0.294) (0.280) (0.308)
No written contract 0.052 0.050 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.054
(0.222) (0.218) (0.226) (0.221) (0.217) (0.226)
Social orientation 0.187 0.181 0.193 0.186 0.181 0.193
(0.225) (0.226) (0.224) (0.225) (0.226) (0.224)
Achievement orientation 0.087 0.091 0.083 0.088 0.092 0.083
∗(0.192) (0.198) (0.185) (0.192) (0.199) (0.186)
Openness to experience 0.178 0.177 0.180 0.178 0.176 0.179
(0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248)
Higher education, mother 0.082 0.078 0.085 0.082 0.078 0.085
(0.274) (0.269) (0.279) (0.274) (0.269) (0.279)
Higher education, father 0.120 0.119 0.121 0.119 0.118 0.121
(0.325) (0.324) (0.326) (0.324) (0.323) (0.326)
Higher education, partner 0.170 0.173 0.167 0.170 0.173 0.167
(0.376) (0.378) (0.373) (0.375) (0.378) (0.373)
Parent supervises others 0.294 0.299 0.289 0.293 0.298 0.289
(0.456) (0.458) (0.453) (0.455) (0.457) (0.453)
Unemployment rate 0.044 0.047 0.040 0.044 0.047 0.040
(0.256) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.024)
JPI 0.725 0.630 0.811 0.725 0.630 0.811
(0.980) (0.988) (1.173) (0.980) (0.988) (1.173)
Mean values reported, standard deviation in brackets. Unemployment rate calculated from ESS data over country–round pairs.
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